Why Algeria is Not Egypt by Geoff D. Porter North Africa Risk Consulting

Why Algeria is not Egypt

With protests against Ben Ali in Tunis and Mubarak in Egypt having partially succeeded, there is a lot of analysis that suggests there is a domino effect taking place in the Middle East and North Africa. That it’s only a matter of time before the revolutionary spirit spreads throughout the region. One of the countries mentioned most often is Algeria. But Algeria is not Egypt.

It’s not Tunisia. Nor is it Jordan or Yemen. And there are a number of explanations why mass popular protest will not emerge in Algeria and why President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s government is in no greater jeopardy than it normally is.

1)      Watch and learn: The plainest argument for the unlikelihood of unrest in Algeria is that it has had the benefit of observing (and learning from) the missteps of first Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and then Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Bouteflika is also likely watching to see what effect King Abdullah’s dismissal of his government has in Jordan. Just the simple fact that Bouteflika has had more time to prepare for popular protests argues against the protests’ effectiveness. The protestors have been deprived of the “flash mob” aspect that made the Tunisian and Egyptian demonstrations so effective. The Algerian government is already out ahead of the protest movement, whereas Ben Ali and Mubarak were struggling to catch up to theirs.

2)      Been there, done that: A more nuanced explanation of why Algeria is different is that Algeria effectively already had its revolution. Algeria is already a post-conflict society. And it doesn’t have the stomach for another revolution. In 1991, Algeria’s first multi-party elections would have resulted in the Islamist political party (Islamic Salvation Front or FIS) taking control of the government. The military stepped in and the country plunged into the Dark Decade – 10 years of violence and horrific bloodletting. Its population evinces the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and many Algerians are wary of abrupt change. Algerians hanker for change, but few want to risk descending into another decade of chaos.

3)      Change is already afoot: A third argument is that elite fracture is already taking place in Algeria, albeit discretely and in slow motion. One of the factors that led to Ben Ali’s sudden departure from Tunisia was that he had lost the support of the military and was abandoned by members of even his own inner circle. Likewise, Mubarak is losing the support of his own party as they prepare for the inevitable post-Mubarak era. He has also not been able to rely on the military. By contrast, leadership in Algeria is already split and there is already a power struggle taking place between the presidency (Bouteflika) and the military (represented by the head of military intelligence Mohamed Mediene). The power struggle has played out over the last year with corruption investigations that led to the removal of government officials, assassinations, and manipulation of political parties. (It bears mentioning that protests against the government that were held on 22 January were organized by a political party that is aligned with Mediene and fit into the context of the existing power struggle between elite factions rather than broad popular protest.)

4)      Buying its way to stability: Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and especially Yemen, Algeria has ample cash on hand to buy its way out of any popular unrest that arises from increasing cost of living. Algeria’s $160 billion foreign exchange reserves give it wide fiscal maneuverability. For example, during the protests in early January over rising food prices, Algeria suspended the VAT and import duties on food stuffs in order to bring prices back down. In short, Algeria sacrificed tax revenue for the sake of stability. Why? Because it could. Oil trading above $100/barrel just gives it more room to maneuver.

5)      Location, location, location: A final big difference between Algeria and Tunisia or Egypt is simply how cities are laid out. Unlike Tunis or Cairo, Algiers has no big squares or wide-open urban spaces where protestors can gather and occupy.

During the 19^th century, the French colonial powers struggled to come up with a coherent urban plan. The city developed somewhat higgledy-piggledy, a patchwork of neighborhoods. Later, as Algerians waged a war of independence against the French, the security advantages of not having large open urban spaces became clear. Still later the Algerian government itself recognized the advantages of limited public space and discouraged creating big squares. Geography also plays a role. Algiers is not a very “walkable” – or “marchable” – city. It’s hilly and scattered. It’s tough to get around. Although it’s a city of three million, it has the feel of several interconnected towns rather than an urban mass. There are few wide boulevards to march down. There are no bridges on which to clash with police. In fact, it’s more conducive to street fighting than it is to mass demonstrations, something both the French and Algerian governments eventually learned.

This is not to say that Algeria is a happy place, immune from popular protest. Algerians have a lot to be angry about and have reason to claim that their government has failed them. Algeria had the world’s 12^th largest FX reserves in the world in 2010, ahead of France and the UK. But according to the EIU’s Cities Liveability Index in 2010, Algiers ranked third worst in the world, on a par with Dhaka Bangladesh. Housing is in short supply. Employment is scarce. The bureaucracy is arrogant and domineering. And there is very little for the average resident of Algiers to do.

Even so, for all of the reasons laid out above, the popular revolutions that we witnessed in Tunis and are seeing in Cairo are unlikely to unfold in Algiers. It is not the next domino to fall.